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Non-Technical Summary
As of 2008, Germany has severely changed its thin capitalization rule by introducing the so-called
interest barrier. This new rule aims at prohibiting tax avoidance of multinational firms by means
of cross-border internal loans. For reasons of non-discrimination, the rule is, however, equally
attributable on the national level and it is applicable to both internal and external debt. Since
its beginning, the German interest barrier has had a very poor reputation as it was believed to
distort financing decisions and hereby harm production efficiency.
Four years after its introduction, the time has come to empirically evaluate the interest barrier.
In this paper, we trace to what extent the interest barrier impacted firms' financing decisions. We
distinguish between national and multinational firms as well as between the effects on internal
debt to assets and external debt to assets.
Thin capitalization rules prevent firms from deducting excessive interest expenses from their
tax base. Before 2008, the interest on internal debt going beyond 1.5 times the equity of the
respective shareholder was not deductible. As of 2008, interest payments exceeding the interest
earnings are generally only deductible at the amount of 30% of EBITDA once the exemption
limit of an initial EUR 1 million is exceeded. In our empirical setup, we identify firms which
would have been affected by the new interest barrier, had it already been in place in the years
2005 to 2007, i.e. before its actual coming into force. Then we analyze empirically how these
firms adjusted their debt to assets ratios and their net interest payments as compared to the
control group.
Our regressions show that the interest barrier drove firms to lower their debt to assets ratios
and their net interest payments. Opposing its original intention, it seems to be, however, also
the national firms which adjusted their capital structure and it was external rather than internal
debt which was reduced. Therefore, we conclude that the interest barrier does indeed affect
financing decisions, but predominantly not in the intended way and not of the intended firms.
In sensitivity analyses, we examine highly leveraged and low profitable firms, which are likely to
be subject to the interest barrier. The results suggest a debt-reducing interest barrier effect for
these companies as well.
Our empirical evidence does not provide a positive evaluation of the new interest barrier.
The legislator might have focused too much on the task of counteracting excessive and abusive
internal lending by a few multinationals, whilst disregarding the effects on non-abusive firms.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Mit der Einführung der sogenannten Zinsschranke hat Deutschland zum Jahr 2008 seine Un-
terkapitalisierungsregel tiefgreifend geändert. Mit dieser neuen Regelung wird primär das Ziel
verfolgt, die von multinationalen Unternehmen durch grenzüberschreitende Kreditvergaben be-
triebene Steuervermeidung zu bekämpfen. Aus Gründen der Nichtdiskriminierung gilt die Regel
jedoch gleichermaßen für rein nationale Unternehmen und für externes ebenso wie für internes
Fremdkapital. Von Beginn an hatte die deutsche Zinsschranke einen sehr schlechten Ruf. Sie
steht im Verdacht Finanzierungsentscheidungen zu verzerren und somit die Produktionseffizienz
zu mindern.
Vier Jahre nach Einführung der Zinsschranke ist die Zeit reif für eine empirisch fundierte
Evaluation. Wir untersuchen, inwieweit die Zinsschranke die Finanzierungsentscheidungen von
Unternehmen beeinflusst hat. Dabei weisen wir die Einflüsse auf nationale und multinationale
Unternehmen sowie auf die externe und interne Fremdkapitalquote jeweils gesondert aus.
Unterkapitalisierungsregeln verhindern bei Unternehmen mit übermäßiger Fremdfinanzierung
den steuerlichen Zinsabzug. Vor dem Jahr 2008 waren Zinsen, die sich auf internes Fremdkapital
in Höhe von mehr als dem 1,5-fachen des Anteilseignerkapitals bezogen, nicht abziehbar. Seit
2008 hängt die Abziehbarkeit dagegen nicht mehr von der Fremdkapitalquote, sondern von Zins-
zahlungen ab. So sind die Zinserträge übersteigenden Zinsaufwendungen nun grundsätzlich nur
noch in Höhe von 30% des EBITDA abziehbar, sobald die Freigrenze von einer Million Euro
überschritten ist. Wir identifizieren diejenigen Firmen, die von der neuen Zinsschranke getroffen
worden wären, wenn diese bereits von 2005 bis 2007, also vor ihrer tatsächlichen Einführung,
anwendbar gewesen wäre. Sodann untersuchen wir empirisch, wie solche Firmen im Vergleich
zur Kontrollgruppe ihre Fremdkapitalquote und ihre Nettozinszahlungen angepasst haben.
Ganz grundsätzlich hat die Zinsschranke dazu geführt, dass Firmen sowohl ihre Fremdkapi-
talquote als auch ihre Nettozinszahlungen gesenkt haben. Entgegen der Zinsschrankeninten-
tion haben jedoch auch die nationalen Firmen diesen Schritt vollzogen und es wurde außerdem
eher externes als internes Fremdkapital heruntergefahren. Somit wirkt die Zinsschranke tatsäch-
lich auf Finanzierungsentscheidungen, jedoch weder in der beabsichtigten Art und Weise, noch
ausschließlich bei den anvisierten Firmen. In Sensitivitätsanalysen werden besonders hoch ver-
schuldete Firmen sowie Unternehmen mit niedriger Profitabilität untersucht, da diese mit hoher
Wahrscheinlichkeit von der Zinsschranke betroffen sind. Die Ergebnisse deuten auch für diese
Gruppe auf schuldenreduzierende Zinsschrankeneffekte hin.
Insgesamt stellen die von uns gefundenen empirischen Erkenntnisse der Zinsschranke kein
gutes Zeugnis aus. Der Gesetzgeber hat sich vermutlich zu sehr darauf konzentriert, wie er
die exzessive grenzüberschreitende Kreditvergabe einiger weniger multinationaler Unternehmen
bekämpfen kann und dabei die Effekte auf unbescholtene Firmen vernachlässigt.
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Abstract:
We analyze the impact of changes in thin capitalization rules on corporations' capital
structure. Thin capitalization rules prevent firms from deducting excessive interest ex-
penses from their tax base. As of 2008, Germany has severely changed its thin capitali-
zation rule by targeting interest payments instead of debt to equity ratios. The new rule
has primarily been introduced to prohibit tax avoidance by multinationals. For reasons
of non-discrimination, the rule is, however, equally attributable on the national level and
it is applicable to both internal and external financing. The theoretical and analytical
literature has brought forward many arguments stating that the new interest barrier is
harmful to firms, distorting their financing decisions. Four years after its introduction, the
time has come to empirically evaluate the interest barrier. The DAFNE database serves
as our source of reference. We differentiate by firm characteristics, by industry and by
kind of debt. We find that the interest barrier drove firms to lower their debt to assets ra-
tios and their net interest payments. Opposing its original intention, it was, however, also
the national firms which adjusted their capital structure, and it was external rather than
internal debt which was reduced. Thus, the interest barrier does indeed affect financing
decisions, but predominantly not in the intended way and not of the intended firms. In
sensitivity analyses we examine highly leveraged and low profitable firms, which are likely
to be subject to the interest barrier. The results suggest a debt-reducing interest barrier
effect for these companies as well.
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1 Introduction
Not without a lack of irony, Homburg (2007) calls the interest barrier an unprecedented tax
innovation. Even before its introduction in 2008, the German interest barrier had a very
poor scientific reputation. Based on analytical considerations, it is supposed to distort
financing decisions, thus harming production efficiency. It is said to drive into bankruptcy
even those firms which have no intentions of abusive tax evasion whatsoever. According
to Homburg (2007), the German interest barrier combines maximal economic damage
with minimal fiscal utility. The numerous critical articles on the German regulation did,
however, not prevent Italy from introducing a very similar rule in the same year 2008.
Thin capitalization rules prevent firms from deducting interest from their tax base if
certain conditions are met. Before 2008, the amount of (non-)deductible interest was
determined by a firm's debt to equity ratio. The interest on internal debt going beyond
1.5 times the equity of the respective shareholder was not deductible. As of 2008, the
deductibility of interest no longer depended on the ratio, but on interest payments. Gen-
erally speaking, interest payments exceeding the interest earnings are only deductible at
the amount of 30% of EBITDA once the exemption limit of an initial EUR 1 million
is exceeded. The new interest barrier rule covers all sources of interest and, unlike the
previous rule, not only internal but also external debt. It has primarily been introduced
to prohibit tax avoidance by multinationals. For reasons of non-discrimination, the rule
is equally attributable on the national level. Non-deductible interest is recorded in an in-
terest carryforward. Figure 1 below illustrates the functioning of the new interest barrier.
Homburg (2007) is not the only - convincing - analytical paper which severely criticizes
the interest barrier. Blaufus and Lorenz (2009), Bolik, Fuest and Ortmann-Babel (2010),
Eilers (2007), Endres (2007), Herzig and Bohn (2007), Hey (2007), Musil and Volmering
(2008), Stangl and Rödder (2007) Töben (2007) and Welling (2007) draw similarly nega-
tive conclusions. German politicians have reacted to this critique by slightly relaxing the
interest barrier in 2009, when they retroactively increased the exemption amount from
EUR 1 million to EUR 3 million and also enlarged the tolerance range of the so-called
escape clause, comparing the firm's leverage to the group's leverage.
Four years after its introduction, the time has come to empirically evaluate the inter-
est barrier. Affected firms might either be struck by the interest barrier or might have
taken evasive actions. Our empirical estimations are based on Bureau van Dijk's DAFNE
database, which is a detailed subgroup of the Amadeus database covering German compa-
nies. We differentiate by firm characteristics, by industry and by different kinds of debt.
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Figure 1: Interest Barrier - Legal Scheme
Cf. Winkeljohann and Fuhrmann (2007). As of 2009, the tax al-
lowance was increased to EUR 3 million and the company leverage
could exceed the group leverage by 2%.
We find that the interest barrier made firms lower their debt to assets ratios. Opposing
its original intention, it was, however, also the national firms which adjusted their capital
structure. In robustness checks, we find interest barrier effects for highly leveraged firms
and for companies with a low profitability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a
literature review. Thereafter, the effects of the thin capitalization legislation are worked
out analytically in Section 3. This serves as the basis for our development of hypotheses
in Section 4. Descriptive statistics are provided in Section 5, followed by the empirical
approach in Section 6 and results in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
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2 Literature Review
Ever since Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) published their theory of the capital struc-
ture of a firm, the tax advantage of debt financing in contrast to equity financing has been
widely discussed in the literature. Modigliani and Miller argue that debt financing is more
advantageous than equity financing since interest expenses are tax deductible. However,
they also highlight that there are a lot of non-tax reasons influencing the optimal financ-
ing decision. As a result, they reject the idea that 100% debt financing is usually the
best choice. Further analytical research strengthened this position and revealed that it
might not always be beneficial to finance corporate undertakings with debt. Myers (1977)
for example, argues that an already existing asset stock should rather be financed with a
higher percentage of debt compared to new growth opportunities.
Following the analytical approaches, multiple authors tried to show these effects empiri-
cally. MacKie-Mason (1990) as well as Graham (1999) find positive effects of corporate
tax rates on leverage by focusing on data about primary seasoned offerings. Gordon and
Lee (2001 and 2007) reveal a much larger effect that is particularly strong for small and
for very large firms but not for medium-sized firms. Additionally, Desai, Foley and Hines
(2004) can show that the effect varies with the source of debt. Their study on U.S. firms
yields a higher responsiveness to tax-rate differences of internal debt compared to external
debt. Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème (2008) also provide support for the international
debt and profit shifting of multinationals. The corporate tax rate effect on financing
decisions has been summarized in a literature review by Graham (2003) and in a meta
study by Feld, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2011).
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham (1999), Alworth and Arachi (2001) and Overesch
and Voeller (2010) do not only focus on the positive effect of corporate tax rates on the
debt level, but also try to identify a proposed negative effect of high personal taxes on
interest.3 Each of these studies is based on a different dataset and covers an international
context. All of them clearly identify the proposed negative effect.
However, there are also studies that fail to identify either of the above mentioned effects
or that stress other effects as relatively more important. Taub (1975) for example, finds
a counterintuitive negative effect of higher corporate tax rates on debt financing. Myers
(1984) postulates that the past literature provided no convincing evidence on corporate
3Miller (1977) argues that, at the margin, a negative effect of personal taxation might negate the
corporate tax advantage of debt financing, because most tax systems favour dividend income to
interest income. De Angelo and Masulis (1980) implement an interior leverage equilibrium model
considering the interaction of corporate and personal taxes.
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taxes increasing the leverage. Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) find that firm-specific
leverage remains constant over a very long period of time, i.e. more than 20 years,
concluding that the majority of variation in capital structure is time-invariant and that
much of this variation is unaccounted for by existing empirical specifications.
When it comes to the financial effects of tax policy, one may wonder whether the meas-
ures to counter the effects described above were successful. Haufler and Runkel (2008),
Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) as well as Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber and
Wamser (2008) all focus on the question of whether thin capitalization rules result in a
reduction of internal debt and whether this increases fiscal revenues. Wamser (2008) focus
on the introduction of the German thin capitalization rule in 1994 and its amendments
in 2001 and 2004. All of these empirical studies find evidence on a significant reduction
of internal debt following the introduction of a thin capitalization rule. However, they
do not show that this reduction also resulted in a reduction of overall debt. They rather
suggest that internal debt was substituted with external debt resulting in no increase in
tax revenues.
As mentioned in the introduction, the emergence of the German interest barrier rule in
2007 was predominantly criticized in the German tax literature for being too far-reaching.
Three elements of the interest barrier rule are heavily criticized. First of all, the rule is
said to overshoot the mark because not only internal but also external debt financing is
limited (cf. Hey (2007), Homburg (2007)). Second, the interest barrier rule is seen as
being harmful, especially to companies in financial distress. It is argued that the interest
barrier rule can result in high taxation for highly leveraged companies having low earnings.
It might force companies which are in a loss situation before consideration of the rule into
paying taxes, thus making their situations even worse. The interest barrier is therefore
seen as reinforcing a crisis (cf. Endres (2007), Grotherr (2008), Herzig and Bohn (2007),
Hey (2007), Köhler (2007), Schwarz (2008)). Third, the so-called escape-clause is heavily
criticized. It allows companies to escape the interest barrier rule if they can prove that
the German company does not deviate from the equity-quota of the group, i.e. that the
German business is not highly leveraged compared to the overall group. Dörfler and Vogl
(2007), Endres (2007), Ganssauge and Mattern (2008), Grotherr (2008), Thiel (2007)
and Welling (2007), however, see this equity test as highly complex and as bearing high
administrative costs. Focusing on legal aspects, Führich (2007), Hornig (2007) and Musil
and Volmering (2008) argue that the interest barrier rule does not comply with EU-law
and the German constitution.
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Empirical enquiries of the interest barrier rule in Germany have, so far, mainly focused
on two aspects. Bolik, Fuest and Ortmann-Babel (2010) as well as Herzig, Lochmann and
Liekenbrock (2008) asked companies about their perception of the interest barrier rule and
whether they are being harmed by it. Bolik, Fuest and Ortmann-Babel (2010) show that
most companies conceptually reject the rule and the newly-introduced loss carryforward
restrictions, and that companies expect a higher tax burden as a result of the new interest
barrier rule. Herzig, Lochmann and Liekenbrock (2008) show that 43% of the companies
expect to be harmed by the rule. The second aspect that has been traced empirically
is which companies will be harmed by the rule. Though the expected numbers differ
between 150 and 1511 companies, Bach and Buslei (2009) as well as Blaufus and Lorenz
(2009) expect the rule to be particularly harmful to large companies.
Even when the rule was adjusted in 2009, criticism continued. Rödding (2009) and Lenz,
Doerfler and Adrian (2010) argue that the equity-quota computation is still problematic
and demand the conversion of the newly increased exemption limit of EUR 3 million into
a tax allowance. Additionally, Herzig and Liekenbrock (2010) stress problems with the
EBITDA-carryover.
3 General Analytics
Firms might lower their debt to assets ratios if the advantage of debt financing decreases.
We illustrate this by comparing the net present value of a debt financed and an equity
financed investment.
If the investor provides equity to the firm, the net present value of the investment is
given by
NPVE = EX0 +
n∑
t=1
(It − EXt −DEPt)(1− τc)(1− τs)
[1 + i(1− τi)]t , (1)
where EX0 is the amount of investment, It and EXt are the income and expenses in
period t, DEPt is the amount of depreciation, i is the interest rate, and τc and τs are
the tax rates for corporate profits on the firm and shareholder level. τi is the tax rate on
interest earnings. If the investor instead chooses to provide capital in the form of debt,
the net present value is
NPVD = NPVE +
n∑
t=1
γINTt(1− τs)τc + INTt(τs − τi)
[1 + i(1− τi)]t , (2)
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where INTt are interest expenses for debt provided by the investor and 0 < γ < 1 is the
fraction of interest payments that is deductible from the corporate tax base.4 γ equals 1
if no thin capitalization rules exist, but is < 1 if the company is affected by the interest
barrier, for example. As the deductiblity of interest payments leads to a lower taxation
than in the equity financed investment where dividends are not tax-deductible, we see in
equation (2) that the net present value of a debt financed investment is always greater
than the net present value of an equity financed investment as long as some interest
expenses are deductible from the corporate tax base, in particular as long as γ > τi−τs
(1−τs)τc .
This means that firms generally have a tax-induced incentive to use debt rather than
equity as a means of financing. This result was first developed by Modigliani and Miller
(1963). Opposing this tax advantage of debt financing, there are other determinants of
the capital structure choice like legal constraints, risk considerations and the availability
of debt, leading to the fact that we do not exclusively observe debt financed investments.
The optimal fraction of debt, however, is supposed to be positively affected by the tax
advantage. We are particularly interested in the effect of γ. Equation (2) shows that
the tax advantage of debt increases in γ. Thus, assuming that the introduction of the
interest barrier in Germany in 2008 leads to a decrease of γ, the relative advantage of
debt financing over equity financing decreases and therefore the application of debt in the
years after the reform is generally supposed to decrease.
To find out for which firms the new interest barrier is more restrictive than the old
debt to assets rule with its 1.5 internal debt to equity safe haven, we compare the interest
expenses that are non-deductible under both rules on a company level. We first take a
look at the old rule. The non-deductible interest expenses (NDI) are given by
NDIold :=

(
1− 1.5
λD/E
)
iλD, if > 0
0, otherwise,
(3)
where i is the interest rate payable for debt, E is the equity of the considered company
and λ is the fraction of total debt that is labeled as internal debt. As a result, the term in
parantheses is the fraction of internal debt for which interest expenses are non-deductible
4This result comes from NPVD = EX0 +
n∑
t=1
[(It−EXt−DEPt−γINTt)(1−τc)−(1−γ)INTt](1−τs)+INTt(1−τi)
[1+i(1−τi)]t ,
where only γ · INTt are deductible from the corporate tax base and (1− γ)INTt, the part that is not
deductible, is only deducted from the personal tax base. In addition, the interest payments received
by the investor are fully taxed on the personal level.
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under the old rule. Under the new rule, the amount of non-deductible interest is
NDInew :=
{
i(D − V )− 0.3 · EBITDA, if > 0
0, otherwise.
(4)
Here, V are the lendings of the company given to other parties and EBITDA are the
earnings before interest and depreciation which is the sum of earnings before interest,
EBIT , and the amount of depreciation in the considered period, DEP .5 In Figure 2 we
show the non-deductible interest expenses as a percentage of total assets under the old
(dashed lines) and the new rule (solid lines) as a function of the debt to assets ratio D
A
.6
We see that the slope of NDIold is higher than the one of NDInew.
Figure 2: NDIold and NDInew as functions of DA for different λs and rs
Dashed lines are non-deductible interest payments (NDI) in per cent of total assets under the old rule
and solid lines are non-deductible interest payments in per cent of total assets under the new rule.
For given values of the profitability r, which is defined as EBIT divided by total assets
and determines NDInew and for λ, determining NDIold, we sometimes find an intersection
of both lines. From this critical value for the debt to assets ratio onwards, the old rule
leads to a higher amount of non-deductible expenses than the new rule. This is the case
where r and λ are relatively high, meaning profitable firms with lots of internal debt. For
firms with a lower profitability which mainly have external debt in their balance sheet,
NDInew is likely to be higher than NDIold. The analytical form for this critical value of
the debt to assets ratio for which both rules lead to the same amount of non-deductible
5We do not mention the exemptions of the new rule in this analytical part for the sake of simplicity. In
addition, we assume that the interest rate is the same for both borrowing and lending.
6V = 0 and the ratio of depreciation to total assets DEPA = 0.05 in this example.
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interest expenses is given by
NDInew ≥ NDIold
⇔ D
A

≤ 1.5−
V
A
+ 0.3( r
i
+ DEP
A·i )
λ+ 0.5− 1 , if NDIold > 0
≥ V
A
+ 0.3(
r
i
+
DEP
A · i ), if NDIold = 0.
(5)
If all interest expenses are deductible under the old rule, the debt to assets ratio, from
which NDInew > 0, increases in profitability, the lending-fraction and the depreciation-
fraction of assets. In addition, it decreases in the interest rate. If the old rule also restricts
interest deductibility, the new rule is stricter than the old one if the debt to assets ratio
is below a critical value depending on the same variables and, in addition, on λ. Solving
for r leads to
NDInew ≥ NDIold
⇔ r ≤

i
0.3
[
(1− λ− 1.5) D
A
− V
A
+ 1.5
]
− DEP
A
, if NDIold > 0
i
0.3
[
D
A
− V
A
]
− DEP
A
, if NDIold = 0.
(6)
If the old rule does not restrict interest deductibility, the critical value for r increases
in the debt to assets ratio and the interest rate. In addition, it decreases in the lending-
fraction and depreciation-fraction of assets. This is because the interest barrier rule
looks at net interest expenses and compares them to earnings before depreciation. If
some interest expenses are non-deductible under the old rule, the critical value for r also
depends on the fraction of internal debt λ. Then, it decreases in D
A
if λ is fixed. Figure
3 shows the run of the critical-r-curve as a function of D
A
for different λs.7 If λ = 0,
all interest expenses are deductible under the old rule because it only triggered internal
debt. The result is a strictly increasing critical value of r in D
A
. If λ > 0, the curve forms
a kink. For λ = 0.3, for example, the critical value for r is the same for D
A
= 0.7 and
D
A
= 1.0 and equals 0.067. This means the difference of NDInew and NDIold is the same
for the two debt to assets ratios and r = 0.067. The difference between these two points
is that NDInew = NDIold = 0 if DA = 0.7 and NDInew = NDIold > 0 if
D
A
= 1.0. We can
summarize by saying that, in our example, the new rule denies more interest expenses to
be deductible than the old rule if D
A
is between 0.7 and 1.0 and the profitability is lower
than 6.7%, i.e. if the company is located in the grey area under the r-curve. Descriptive
7 V
A = 0 and
AfA
A = 0.05 in this example.
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statistices for D
A
, r, λ and DEP
A
are shown in Table 3 of Section 5.
Figure 3: Critical rentability as function of D
A
for different λs
We can conclude that only specific firms are supposed to suffer more from the new
interest barrier than from the old debt to equity rule. As we can see in Figures 2 and 3,
the interest barrier is especially harmful for firms with a low profitability whereas firms
with an average profitability are likely to remain unaffected by the reform or even benefit
from the new rule. This corresponds to findings of Blaufus and Lorenz (2009). In addition,
the old rule was more harmful for firms having a high fraction of internal debt to total
debt. Therefore, in our empirical analysis, we divide the dataset into different groups of
firms comparing their respective reactions after the reform.
4 Development of Hypotheses
When the new interest barrier was introduced in 2008, the German legislator first and
foremost aimed at one specific goal: putting an end to the tax-induced abusive internal
cross-border lending of multinational companies.8 In order to avoid conflicts with the
European Court of Justice, however, the new anti-avoidance rule could not specifically
target multinationals, but had to treat cross-border lending and purely national lending
in the same way. As shown above, the interest barrier differentiates neither by the number
of countries involved, nor whether internal or external debt is at hand. Thus, companies
can neither avoid the rule by expanding or concentrating their business nor by switching
between external and internal lending.
8Cf. the official justification for the interest barrier, BR-Drucks. 220/07 (2007), p. 53.
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The actions which can actually be taken by companies in order to avoid unfavorable
consequences of the interest barrier lead to results very much in line with the intention of
the legislator. A company can cut the leverage in the high tax country, it can grant more
loans in order to increase its interest earnings or it can aim at achieving a higher EBITDA
without adjusting its leverage. All of these measures taken by a company generate and
secure the tax base in the high tax country applying the interest barrier. In this paper we
aim at analyzing whether the companies affected by the new interest barrier in Germany
lowered their leverage. Even though we carry out an empirical analysis on the micro level,
our approach also allows for conclusions regarding to what extent the legislator reached
its goals and to what extent it caused collateral damage by influencing and punishing
companies he did not genuinely aim at.
The basic technical idea behind our identification method is the following: we identify
firms which would have been affected by the new interest barrier if it had already been
in place in the years 2005 to 2007, i.e. before its actual coming into force in 2008. Then
we analyze empirically how these firms adjusted their debt to assets ratios as compared
to the control group. It is a necessity to split the treatment group from the control group
based on their characteristics before the introduction of the interest barrier, because the
information after it already comprehends the firms' reactions.
Our very first hypothesis is very general. It builds on the assumption that firms try to
avoid non-deductible interest. Even though non-deductible interest is recorded in an inter-
est carryforward, its existence does not decisively influence the hypothesis. As compared
to an immediate deduction, the carryfoward brings a net present value disadvantage and
its applicability is uncertain, especially for struggling firms. Once the interest barrier has
come into force, companies can calculate to what extent they are negatively affected by
the legislation and adjust their capital structure accordingly. Firms arriving at the con-
clusion that they are not affected by the interest barrier, by contrast, have no particular
reason to adjust their leverage. These firms serve as the control group. Of course, there
are other effects influencing the optimal leverage such as the decline of the corporate tax
rate or macroeconomic criteria influencing the interest rate.9 Given that such effects are
the same to both of the analyzed groups, they do not prevent the sound identification of
an interest barrier effect. Thus, we state hypothesis H1:
H 1. After the introduction of the new interest barrier, the hypothetically ex ante hit firms
lowered their leverage. This holds especially true concerning firms which are more severely
affected by the new interest barrier than by the previous rule.
9As of 2008, for example, the German corporate income tax rate was lowered from 25% to 15%.
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The interest barrier was set up to prohibit legal but unpleasant tax avoidance by multi-
national firms. The provision of loans from subsidiaries in low-tax countries such as
Ireland to company units in high-tax countries such as Germany should be prevented.
Interest is taxed where it is received but reduces the tax base in the high-tax country. If
multinationals actually set up such financial structures with the primary intention of sav-
ing taxes, they should easily be able to adjust them if necessary. Based on this rationale,
even though the interest barrier does not explicitly distinguish between multinational and
national lending, the cross-border constructions can be expected to be more elastic. Put
differently, stronger adjustments of the capital structure can be expected by multinational
firms because the - repealed - tax advantage was one of their primary reason for the high
leverage. National firms, by contrast, might very well have other predominant reasons
for using debt such as the sheer absence of alternatives to external financing. Regardless
of their desire to lower their leverage once the interest barrier is in place, these national
firms might not, or at least only to a lower extent, be able to do so. Therefore, our second
hypothesis is the following:
H 2. After the introduction of the new interest barrier, companies belonging to multina-
tional groups lowered their leverage more strongly.
When companies decide to apply debt financing, they still have a choice between internal
debt and external debt. While internal debt stems from shareholders or other members of
the group, external debt is provided by banks or similar lenders. The effect of the interest
barrier introduction might very well differ between these two kinds of debt financing.
The interest barrier first and foremost targets tax-abusive internal debt financing. In
order to prevent evasive constructions it does, however, not distinguish between interest
from internal or external debt. Before the new interest barrier came into force in 2008,
only internal debt was relevant for the calculation of the debt to equity ratio. Therefore,
external debt has become less attractive with the introduction of the new interest barrier.
Given that external debt was previously hardly relevant, in the course of the interest
barrier introduction we should see a relatively stronger reduction in external rather than
in internal debt. Thus, we state our third hypothesis:
H 3. After the introduction of the new interest barrier, companies reduced more strongly
their external debt than their internal debt.
Some debt financing is permissible. The new interest barrier accounts for this by gran-
ting a basic tax allowance and by admitting the deductibility of interest expenses to the
amount of interest earned plus 30% of EBITDA. By introducing the interest barrier, the
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legislator did not aim at generally prohibiting debt financing, but at preventing exces-
sive tax-induced leveraging. With our fourth hypothesis, we investigate to what extent
especially those firms targeted by the new interest barrier actually reduced their debt
to assets ratio. The logic behind our hypothesis is not that such highly leveraged firms
reduce their debt because they are eager to fulfill the wish of the legislator, rather they
are supposed to adjust it because they are the ones which are most severely hit by the
new interest barrier. Given that we refer to the total leverage in this hypothesis and given
that most of the debt in our data is external debt, the treatment group is generally more
negatively affected by the new interest barrier than by the previous thin capitalization
rule. It is therefore likely to adjust its financial structure. Thus, we suppose in our fourth
hypothesis:
H 4. After the introduction of the new interest barrier, especially the 5% most highly
leveraged companies reduced their debt to assets ratios.
In Section 3, we have analytically worked out that firms with a rather low profitability
are more likely to be affected by the new interest barrier than profitable firms. As could
be seen above, the lower a firm's profitability, the more adverse is the new interest barrier
as compared to the previous thin capitalization rule. Those firms facing a more severe rule
than in the past, i.e. for which debt has become less attractive than before, are the ones
which are most likely supposed to lower their leverage. In line with Blaufus and Lorenz
(2009), companies with an average or even above-average profitability, however, are not
negatively affected by the interest barrier rule. When focusing solely on the effect of the
new legislation in the form of the interest barrier, we can state the following hypothesis:
H 5. After the introduction of the new interest barrier, especially the 5% least profitable
companies reduced their debt to assets ratios.
5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We look at the development of the debt to assets ratios and the net interest payments
to assets ratios of 25,751 German corporations between 2005 and 2010 in an unbalanced
panel. Our analysis considers all debt, internal debt and external debt one by one. In
order to analyze the effects of the introduction of the interest barrier we put firms into dif-
ferent groups according to their non-deductible interest payments concerning the old and
the new rule, according to their leverage and according to their profitability. We further
control for the firms' tangibility, profitability, former losses and the number of employees.
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All these data are provided by the DAFNE-database by Bureau van Dijk, a subsam-
ple of the AMADEUS-database containing detailed information of German companies
needed to compute the non-deductible expenses. We use information from unconsoli-
dated statements for all corporations with total assets of more than EUR 1 million, hence
concentrating on medium-sized and large fims. We drop firms with implausible values for
equity, total assets, tangible assets, EBIT, EBITDA, liabilities, profitability, tangibility
and interest payments. For the purpose of our analysis, we exclude firms operating in the
agricultural, mining and finance sector. In addition, we use statutory corporate tax rates
to control for tax rate effects on the companies' leverage. Table 1 defines all variables
used in our regression analysis. Table 2 shows frequencies and absolute numbers of firms
in different groups. In our sample, 487 companies, i.e. 1.89% of all companies, would
have been treated by the new interest barrier in all three years before the introduction if
it had been applicable since 2005. For 345 firms, i.e. 4.38% of the applicable companies,
the new rule would have been more harmful than the old rule.10 In addition, Table 3
provides summary statistics of the applied variables.
10The sample for computing if the new rule is more harmful than the old one is a bit smaller because
we need additional information about the internal leverage. 4.38% = 345/7,878, cf. Table 4 for the
sample size.
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Table 1: Variable definitions
debt to assets total debt divided by total assets, measured in percentage-
points (0.01 = one percent)
internal debt to assets internal debt divided by total assets, measured in
percentage-points (0.01 = one percent)
external debt to assets external debt divided by total assets, measured in
percentage-points (0.01 = one percent)
net interest payments
to assets
total net interest payments divided by total assets, measured
in percentage-points (0.01 = one percent)
internal net interest
payments to assets
internal net interest payments divided by total assets, meas-
ured in percentage-points (0.01 = one percent)
external net interest
payments to assets
external net interest payments divided by total assets, meas-
ured in percentage-points (0.01 = one percent)
reform dummy variable, 1 if observation is made in the years
2008 - 2010, zero if observation is made in years 2005 - 2007
treated dummy variable, 1 if company would have had non-
deductible interest expenses according to the new interest
barrier in all three years before the reform
dependent dummy variable, 1 if company has no shareholder and no
subsidiary with a participation rate of at least 25%
stricter dummy variable, 1 if company would have had more non-
deductible interest expenses according to the new interest
barrier compared to the old thin capitalization rule in all
three years before the reform
high lev dummy variable, 1 if company was in the group of firms with
the 5% highest average leverage in the three years before the
reform
low prof dummy variable, 1 if company was in the group of firms with
the 5% lowest average profitability in the three years before
the reform
tangibility tangible assets divided by total assets, measured in
percentage-points (0.01 = one percent)
profitability EBITDA divided by total assets, measured in percentage-
points (0.01 = one percent)
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Table 1: Variable definitions (continued)
loss carryforward dummy variable, 1 if the profit before taxes was negative in
the year before the observation
str statutory tax rate, measured in percentage-points (0.01 =
one percent)
str ∗ loss carryfwd interaction between str and loss carryforward
ln employees logarithm of number of employees
DEP
A amount of depreciation divided by total assets, measured in
percentage-points (0.01 = one percent)
i interest rate computed by dividing interest paid by total
debt, measured in percentage-points (0.01 = one percent)
r profitability defined as EBIT divided by total assets, meas-
ured in percentage-points (0.01 = one percent)
λ fraction of internal debt to total debt, measured in
percentage-points (0.01 = one percent)
The general source of the variables is the DAFNE-database provided by Bureau van Dijk. Some
variables are built by own computations using the information from DAFNE. Variables with names
combining the above variables by ∗ are interactions of the repective variables. The statutory tax
rates are derived from the IBFD Global Corporate Tax Handbooks.
Table 2: Relative frequencies and numbers of firms in different groups
group all firms nationals multinationals
treated 1.89 (487) 1.43 (334) 6.58 (153)
stricter 4.38 (345) 3.30 (214) 9.39 (131)
high leveraged 3.86 (1077) 3.98 (1018) 2.56 (59)
high leveraged dependent 3.56 (913) 3.68 (854) n.a.
high leveraged independent 0.04 (11) 0.05 (11) n.a.
low profitable 4.69 (1262) 4.53 (1115) 6.54 (147)
low profitable dependent 4.39 (1077) 4.18 (932) n.a.
low profitable independent 0.06 (13) 0.06 (13) n.a.
The table contains relative frequencies of firms in different groups in the regression samples in per
cent. Absolute numbers are depicted in parentheses. Treated means that the company would have
had non-deductible interest expenses triggering the new interest barrier in all three years before
the reform. Independent means that the company has no 25% shareholder or subsidiary. Stricter
means that the company would have had more non-deductible interest expenses based on the new
interest barrier compared to the old rule in all three years before the reform. High leveraged
means that the firm had one of the 5% highest average debt to assets ratios before the reform.
Low profitable means that the firm had one of the 5% lowest average profitabilities before the
reform.
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Table 3: Summaries
all companies
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
debt to assets 88451 0.6204 0.2402 0.0002 1
internal debt to assets 65802 0.1613 0.2017 0 0.9985
external debt to assets 65802 0.4711 0.2399 0 0.9994
net interest payments to assets 88333 0.0074 0.0267 -2.8348 1.2843
internal net interest payments to assets 29225 0.0065 0.0139 -0.0119 1.2064
external net interest payments to assets 29225 -0.0024 0.0265 -1.2019 0.3309
reform 88451 0.5788 0.4938 0 1
treated 88451 0.0204 0.1414 0 1
treated ∗ reform 88451 0.0117 0.1074 0 1
dependent 88451 0.9890 0.1041 0 1
dependent ∗ reform 88451 0.5724 0.4947 0 1
stricter 29649 0.0451 0.2074 0 1
stricter ∗ reform 29649 0.0250 0.1561 0 1
high lev 94320 0.0323 0.1767 0 1
high lev ∗ reform 94320 0.0187 0.1354 0 1
high lev ∗ dependent 87519 0.0303 0.1713 0 1
high lev ∗ reform ∗ dep 87519 0.0179 0.1326 0 1
low prof 92938 0.0428 0.2024 0 1
low prof ∗ reform 92938 0.0234 0.1513 0 1
low prof ∗ dependent 86247 0.0406 0.1973 0 1
low prof ∗ reform ∗ dep 86247 0.0227 0.1490 0 1
tangibility 88451 0.2581 0.2538 0 0.9984
profitability 88451 0.1285 0.1374 -0.2950 0.6358
loss carryforward 88451 0.1617 0.3682 0 1
str 88451 0.3450 0.0417 0.3095 0.3943
str ∗ loss carryfwd 88451 0.0557 0.1278 0 0.3943
str ∗ tangibility 88451 0.0891 0.0890 0 0.3931
ln employees 88451 4.5997 1.2950 0 12.2138
DEP
A 88451 0.0472 0.3457 -0.0071 84.3892
i 84333 0.0233 0.0374 0 7
r 88451 0.0824 0.1732 -6.6173 4.5382
λ 65802 0.2405 0.2595 0 1
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6 Empirical Approach
In order to test our hypotheses we run regressions using a panel approach. We rely on the
variation over time to analyze if and how firms altered their leverage after the introduction
of the interest barrier. We apply a difference in difference approach in order to capture
different reactions for different kinds of firms. Our baseline regression equation is
debt to assetsit =β1 · treatedi + β2 · reformit + β3 · treatedi ∗ reformit (7)
+Xitβ + δi + δt + δj + δjt + it
where debt to assetsit is total debt divided by total assets. The variable treatedi is a
dummy that equals one if the considered firm would have been affected by the new interest
barrier in all three years before its introduction.11 Reformit is a dummy indicating by
the value of one if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier.
Treatedi ∗ reformit is the interaction of these two variables. X is the matrix of time-
varying firm-specific control variables. Subscripts i, j and t denote the company, the
industry and the year. Therefore, δi, δj and δt are company-, industry- and time-fixed
effects, δjt is an industry-time-fixed effect capturing industry-specific developments of the
leverage. Treatedi and reformit are captured by the fixed effects, hence β1 and β2 are
not reported. The coefficient of treatedi ∗ reformit shows if treated firms changed their
debt to assets ratios in a different way than other firms. For the effects on firms which are
more severe hit by the new interest barrier than by the old rule, we replace treatedi by
stricteri. This variable equals one if treatedi is one and non-deductible interest expenses
according to the new rule were higher than the those according to the old rule in all three
years before the reform.12 This approach can be used to test H1. Considering H2, we split
the sample into national companies and multinational companies. H3 is tested with the
same equation replacing the dependent variable by internal and external debt to assets.
To test H4, we replace the treatment dummy by the variable high levi indicating if a
company had an average debt to assets ratio before the reform that was higher than the 95
percent quantile of all considered firms. In addition, we introduce a three-way interaction
to examine if highly leveraged firms which might be affected by the new interest barrier
11For the labeling if a company is treated or not, we generally use the scheme of Figure 1. The escape
clause, comparing the firm's leverage to the group's leverage is, however, disregarded. Concerning
the group membership, we distinguish by the existence or non-existence of a 25% subsidiary and/or
a 25% shareholder.
12The non-deductible amount according to the old rule is calculated by comparing the firm's internal
debt to the firm's equity. All interest expenses for such debt exceeding 1.5 times the equity are labeled
as non-deductible.
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reacted differently from firms which do not have to worry about non-deductible expenses
because they are independent and thus not affected by the new rule. Therefore the
equation changes to
debt to assetsit =β1 · high levi + β2 · reformit + β3 · dependenti (8)
+β4 · high levi ∗ reformit + β5 · high levi ∗ dependenti
+β6 · reformit ∗ dependenti + β7 · high levi ∗ reformit ∗ dependenti
+Xitβ + δi + δt + δj + δjt + it.
A positive β4 means that independent highly leveraged firms have increased their leverage
after the reform compared to other firms with lower debt to assets ratios. This coefficient
is generally not expected to be significant because independent firms are never affected
by the new interest barrier. For dependent firms, β4 and β7 must be added to see the
whole effect. In addition, β6 plus β7 is the difference in reaction between highly leveraged
dependent and independent firms. If these two coefficients are jointly significant, there
is a specific interest barrier effect for potentielly affected firms. We use this three-way
interaction approach to capture the fact that highly leveraged firms might generally reduce
their debt to assets ratios over time to return to their individually aspired ratio.13 The
same kind of analysis is used to test H5 replacing the dummies for highly leveraged firms
by a binary variable which is one if a company belongs to those firms with the 5 percent
lowest average profitablities before the reform.
7 Regression Results
Our regressions deal one by one with the hypotheses derived in Section 4. The first
three result tables, Tables 4 to 6, cover the issues outlined in hypotheses H1 to H3, while
Table 7 and Table 8 trace H4 and H5. Table 4 is based on all firms, whereas Table 5
focuses on national firms and Table 6 focuses on multinationals. The same differentiation
is maintained in Tables 7 and 8. The structure within the tables is always the same: The
columns to the left of a table analyze the effects on total debt to assets, the columns in
the middle focus on the effects on internal debt to assets and the columns to the right
present the effects on external debt to assets. All regressions are difference-in-difference
approaches showing the effects of the interest barrier introduction on financing decisions
of different kinds of companies. We use a fixed effects estimator in order to capture
unobserved firm, industry and time specific effects. The Annex shows additional results.
13Cf. Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008).
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Table 4: Baseline Regressions, all firms
all debt internal debt external debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated ∗ reform -0.0122** -0.0016 -0.0119
(0.0059) (0.0072) (0.0079)
stricter ∗ reform -0.0144* 0.0114 -0.0259***
(0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0092)
tangibility 0.0396** 0.0363 -0.0189 0.0188 0.0397 0.0086
(0.0195) (0.0350) (0.0237) (0.0409) (0.0252) (0.0393)
profitability -0.1892*** -0.1848*** -0.0838*** -0.1089*** -0.1048*** -0.0801***
(0.0071) (0.0116) (0.0088) (0.0134) (0.0085) (0.0119)
loss carryforward 0.1585*** 0.1246*** 0.0293** 0.0566*** 0.1064*** 0.0616***
(0.0093) (0.0148) (0.0116) (0.0176) (0.0115) (0.0162)
str ∗ loss carryfwd -0.3822*** -0.2883*** -0.0606* -0.1306** -0.2569*** -0.1391***
(0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0336) (0.0508) (0.0334) (0.0466)
str ∗ tangibility -0.1485*** -0.1049 -0.1044* -0.1677* -0.0528 0.0673
(0.0446) (0.0825) (0.0577) (0.0993) (0.0588) (0.0922)
ln employees 0.0192*** 0.0212*** -0.0083*** -0.0081* 0.0278*** 0.0285***
(0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0037)
observations 88451 29649 65802 27665 65802 27665
companies 25751 7878 20892 7661 20892 7661
R2 0.1011 0.0971 0.0199 0.0347 0.0533 0.0533
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Treated ∗ reform is an interaction of dummies which equals
1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm would have been
treated by the new rule in all three years before the introduction. A negative sign of the coefficient means
that the difference between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated firms compared
to companies not treated by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we use the interaction stricter
∗ reform to analyze if firms, for which the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old
rule in all three years before the reform, reduced their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased
it to a lower extent than other firms. Other variables are described in Table 1. Regressions 3 and 4
repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use
external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-fixed effects. Observations of
German corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. ∗ denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at
the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, the ratio of total debt to assets serves as the de-
pendent variable. The variable treated is a dummy that equals one for those firms which
would have been affected by the new interest barrier in 2005, 2006 and in 2007 if it had
been in place not only from 2008 onwards but already in the three previous years. This
variable is captured by the firm-fixed effects. Being affected means that the interest bar-
rier prevents the immediate deductibility of at least some interest expenses. The variable
reform is a dummy that equals one for those observations that occur after the intro-
duction of the interest barrier. This variable is captured by the year-fixed effects. The
interaction of these two variables, treated ∗ reform, shows if the difference between the
leverage before and after the reform is lower or higher for affected firms compared to unaf-
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fected companies. The negative and significant coefficient of treated ∗ reform, amounting
to -0.0122, means that after the introduction of the interest barrier, those hypothetically
affected firms lowered their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it less strongly
than the control group. When interpreting the result, one has to keep in mind that we
control for firm and industry-year-fixed effects. For example, if the control group lowered
its debt to assets ratio after the reform by ten percentage points, the treatment group
would have lowered it by 12.2 percentage points. Given that we focus on the size of the
change, it can, however, not be seen from the coefficient if the decrease was bigger or
the increase was smaller. In either way, the negative coefficient confirms our hypothesis
H1, because firms concerned with the interest barrier chose, on average, a relatively lower
debt to assets ratio after its introduction compared to other firms.
In the second sentence of hypothesis H1, we suppose that the lowered leverage should be
observable especially concerning firms which are more severely affected by the new interest
barrier than by the previous rule. The binary variable stricter equals one for firms for
which in all three years 2005, 2006 and 2007, the hypothetically applied interest barrier
would have led to more non-deductible interest than the previous rule which was in place
at that time. The significant coefficient of the interaction effect stricter ∗ reform -0.0144
indicates that firms which could expect to suffer more from the interest barrier than from
the ratio-based thin capitalization rule supposedly lowered their debt to assets ratios more
strongly than the control group. This confirms the second sentence in hypothesis H1.
As can be seen by looking at Table 4 as a whole, columns (3) and (4) show the results
for the approaches outlined above using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable
and columns (5) and (6) do so using external debt to assets as the dependent variable.
Based on these general regressions, there is no significant impact of the interest barrier on
the ratio of internal debt to assets. This can be seen from the fact that none of the crucial
coefficients treated ∗ reform and stricter ∗ reform in columns (3) and (4) is significant.
Turning to the effect on external debt to assets, the results presented in columns (5)
and (6) paint a different picture. It seems that firms reacted to the introduction of
the interest barrier predominantly with their external debt. The coefficient of treated ∗
reform in column (5) shows the expected sign but fails to be significant. The crucial
coefficient stricter ∗ reform in column (6), however, clearly confirms hypothesis H3:
After the introduction of the new interest barrier, companies reduced their external debt
more strongly than their internal debt. By comparing the results in columns (5) and (6)
to those in columns (3) and (4), we see that the affected companies did not significantly
differ in adjusting their internal debt to assets ratios compared to non-affected firms.
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Their external debt to assets ratio adjustment, however, clearly differs from the one of
the control group if the new interest barrier rule is more severe than the previous thin
capitalization rule for the considered company. Those firms significantly reduced their
external leverage after the reform compared to the control group. This result corresponds
to the effects on all debt presented in column (2).
The control variables generally show the expected effects. The positive and sometimes
also significant coefficient of tangibility can be explained by the fact that companies
having lots of collateral can more easily and cheaply get loans and thus increase their
leverage. Profitability shows a negative and significant coefficient, which means that
profitable companies can reduce their leverage due to their ability of internally financing by
means of retained earnings. The positive and significant coefficient of loss carryforward
indicates that companies which made losses in the past need to raise debt to pay their
dues and to keep their businesses running. The number of employees negatively impacts
internal debt but positively affects the use of external debt. This is plausible, because,
while some kind of debt is required by all kind of firms, a certain firm size may boost the
ability to tap external sources. Overesch and Voeller (2010) use the interactions between
loss carryforward and str and, in addition, str and tangibility in order to show that
the postive tax effect on the debt to assets ratio decreases for firms with high non-debt
tax shields. We find the same expected negative effects of both of these interactions on
the total, internal and external leverage.14 All of the control variables presented here are
included in all of the regressions shown in the tables to follow. As they remain qualitatively
unchanged, these control variables are not always explicitly reported.
Table 9 in the Appendix is very similar to Table 4 presented above. It differs, however,
concerning the requirement of being treated before the interest barrier introduction. While
in the above regressions the binary variable was one only if the firm was hypothetically
affected in all three years 2005, 2006 and 2007, in the regressions shown in Table 9 it
suffices if the company was hypothetically affected in at least one of the three years. The
results of this sensivity analysis in Table 9 are qualitatively generally the same as those
from Table 4 discussed above. Tables 10 and 11 in the Appendix are analogue robustness
checks for the results discussed below.
Table 4 shows results of regressions including all firms. In our second hypothesis H2,
however, we suppose that multinationals and national firms showed different debt to
assets reactions in face of the new interest barrier. In order to be able to evaluate this
14The result tables do not show coefficients for str, because the variation of this variable is the same for
all considered companies and thus captured by the time-fixed effects.
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hypothesis, we split our sample into those firms which are purely national (cf. Table 5)
and those belonging to a multinational group (cf. Table 6). Depending on the regression
setup, only about 10% to 20% of the firms in our sample are multinationals, whereas 80%
to 90% are national firms.
The results presented in Table 5 refer to national companies. They are qualitatively
comparable to those of all firms presented and discussed above. In some cases, the sig-
nificance or the size effects are higher than in the overall analysis, which indicates that
it was mainly the national firms which reacted to the new interest barrier rule. For rea-
sons of brevity, we do not discuss the results of Table 5 one by one, but only provide an
overview. More detailed explanations of the coefficients can be achieved by referring to
the discussion of Table 4. All in all, the results indicate that those national firms which
are affected by the new interest barrier more strongly reduced their total debt to assets
ratios than the control group. The specific reactions do not refer to the ratio of internal
debt to assets, but they can be traced to the ratio of external debt to assets. This can be
seen from the insignificant coefficient in column (4) as compared to the significant coeffi-
cients in column (6) of Table 5. Table 10 in the Appendix serves as a robustness check of
Table 5 by reducing the requirement of being considered a treated national firm if it was
hypothetically affected by the interest barrier at least once instead of three consecutive
times between 2005 and 2007. The results presented in Table 10 are qualitatively very
similar to those presented in Table 5.
Table 6 deals exclusively with multinational companies. As outlined above, there are
not too many multinationals available in our sample. A look at the whole Table 6 shows
that in only one case a crucial variable is (at the 10 percent level) significant, whereas
all other coefficients are insignificant. The weakly significant coefficient of stricter ∗
reform does not show the expected negative sign and does not prove to stay significant in
robustness checks. We conclude from Table 6 that, contrary to the expectations expressed
in hypothesis H2, multinationals did not show particularly strong reactions. Our results
rather indicate that multinationals did not significantly change their debt to assets ratios,
whereas the national companies did show such interest barrier-induced adjustments. Table
11 in the Appendix serves as a robustness check for the regression results dealing with
multinationals. Table 11 defines the treated and stricter variable like Tables 9 and 10.
There, these variables already change to one if the company is affected in at least one
of the three years before the reform. In Table 11 we find negative effects on all debt
and external debt. These results differ from the ones presented in Table 6. However, the
conclusion concerning H3 remains unchanged. Multinationals did not significantly reduce
their internal leverage, although such a reduction was intended by the new interest barrier.
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Table 5: Baseline Regressions, nationals
all debt internal debt external debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated ∗ reform -0.0153** -0.0051 -0.0150
(0.0068) (0.0083) (0.0093)
stricter ∗ reform -0.0240*** 0.0018 -0.0280***
(0.0090) (0.0100) (0.0104)
tangibility 0.0407** 0.0468 -0.0111 0.0379 0.0316 -0.0039
(0.0200) (0.0367) (0.0244) (0.0443) (0.0263) (0.0427)
profitability -0.1903*** -0.1756*** -0.0808*** -0.1054*** -0.1069*** -0.0740***
(0.0074) (0.0123) (0.0095) (0.0147) (0.0092) (0.0131)
loss carryforward 0.1525*** 0.1281*** 0.0247* 0.0604*** 0.1059*** 0.0610***
(0.0097) (0.0163) (0.0126) (0.0203) (0.0126) (0.0183)
str ∗ loss carryfwd -0.3641*** -0.2957*** -0.0545 -0.1513*** -0.2479*** -0.1252**
(0.0281) (0.0473) (0.0365) (0.0586) (0.0364) (0.0527)
str ∗ tangibility -0.1788*** -0.1706** -0.1279** -0.2244** -0.0624 0.0656
(0.0453) (0.0865) (0.0596) (0.1077) (0.0607) (0.0995)
ln employees 0.0163*** 0.0168*** -0.0100*** -0.0102** 0.0259*** 0.0267***
(0.0029) (0.0044) (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0032) (0.0041)
observations 79278 23905 57340 22098 57340 22098
companies 23427 6483 18655 6276 18655 6276
R2 0.1095 0.1092 0.0224 0.0427 0.0566 0.0577
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Treated ∗ reform is an interaction of dummies which equals
1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm would have been
treated by the new rule in all three years before the introduction. A negative sign of the coefficient means
that the difference between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated firms compared
to companies not affected by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we use the interaction stricter
∗ reform to analyze if firms, for which the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old
rule in all three years before the reform, reduced their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased
it to a lower extent than other firms. Other variables are described in Table 1. Regressions 3 and 4
repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use
external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-fixed effects. Observations of
German corporations not being a member of a multinational group between 2005 and 2010 stem from the
DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. ∗
denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
In contrast to Tables 5 and 6, the consideration of Table 10 and Table 11 indicates that
both national and multinational firms adjusted their leverage after the reform. Based on
these robustness checks we cannot reject H2. The treatment group in Table 11 consists of
firms which are not necessarily affected by the new interest barrier after the reform given
that it suffices to be hypothetically affected only once to be a member of the treatment
group. Therefore, on the one hand, based on what we find in Table 6, one cannot expect
to find any significant effects for this group. On the other hand, such firms might be
able to adjust their financing structure more appropriately than those serving as the
treatment group in Table 6. This second aspect might explain why we find reactions for
multinational companies only in Table 11.
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Table 6: Baseline Regressions, multinationals
all debt internal debt external debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated ∗ reform -0.0133 0.0033 -0.0107
(0.0113) (0.0131) (0.0142)
stricter ∗ reform -0.0035 0.0234* -0.0235
(0.0135) (0.0129) (0.0170)
tangibility 0.1284 0.0271 -0.0198 -0.0742 0.1111 0.1011
(0.0858) (0.1166) (0.0945) (0.1221) (0.0858) (0.1082)
profitability -0.1755*** -0.2214*** -0.0967*** -0.1233*** -0.0920*** -0.1042***
(0.0229) (0.0311) (0.0229) (0.0313) (0.0214) (0.0276)
loss carryforward 0.1666*** 0.0997*** 0.0361 0.0221 0.1004*** 0.0734**
(0.0307) (0.0360) (0.0293) (0.0345) (0.0294) (0.0354)
str ∗ loss carryfwd -0.4119*** -0.2310** -0.0436 -0.0011 -0.2810*** -0.2152**
(0.0891) (0.1039) (0.0847) (0.0999) (0.0856) (0.1029)
str ∗ tangibility -0.0898 0.1361 -0.1272 0.0117 0.0596 0.0937
(0.2189) (0.2846) (0.2383) (0.3026) (0.2213) (0.2669)
ln employees 0.0337*** 0.0357*** -0.0031 -0.0018 0.0366*** 0.0348***
(0.0062) (0.0067) (0.0074) (0.0085) (0.0072) (0.0082)
observations 9173 5744 8462 5567 8462 5567
companies 2324 1395 2237 1385 2237 1385
R2 0.1123 0.1380 0.0604 0.0803 0.0852 0.1024
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Treated ∗ reform is an interaction of dummies which equals
1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm would have been
treated by the new rule in all three years before the introduction. A negative sign of the coefficient means
that the difference between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated firms compared
to companies not affected by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we use the interaction stricter
∗ reform to analyze if firms, for which the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old
rule in all three years before the reform, reduced their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased
it to a lower extent than other firms. Other variables are described in Table 1. Regressions 3 and 4
repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the debendent variable, regressions 5 and 6
use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-fixed effects. Observations
for German corporations being a member of a multinational group between 2005 and 2010 stem from the
DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. ∗
denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
In sum, the first three result tables yield three conclusions. First, confirming H1, after
the introduction of the new interest barrier, the hypothetically ex ante hit firms, and
especially those which are more severely affected by the new interest barrier, lowered
their leverage. Second, concerning H2, our results in the robustness checks differ from
the baseline results. Thus, we can neither reject nor confirm this hypothesis. Third,
confirming H3, the decreased attractiveness of external debt made companies lower their
external rather than their internal debt. The third conclusion, based on the evidence
presented above, indicates that the new interest barrier has possibly caused more damage
than good. It intended to influence multinationals in such a way that they would reduce
their internal debt to assets ratios. The analysis above, however, indicates that first and
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foremost national companies reacted by adjusting their external debt to assets ratio. In
defending the interest barrier, one could put forward the argument that the multinationals
are affected by the rule by no longer being able to deduct their interest expenses. Given
that such firms are very likely to do tax planning, however, such an argument is rather
unlikely to hold.
Table 12 in the Appendix presents an additional analysis which splits up the binary
variable treated into some of its components. By differencing whether a company is
part of a group or has at least one 25% shareholder, whether it has positive net interest
payments, whether it exceeds the general interest allowance and whether its net interest
payments exceed 30% of EBITDA, we can derive which aspects actually drive the firms
to adjust their debt to assets ratios facing the new interest barrier. Table 12 in the Annex
shows negative and significant coefficients of net int > 0 ∗ reform and net int once >
0 ∗ reform, meaning that especially firms with more interest expenses than interest
earnings reduced their debt to assets ratios after the reform. The negative and significant
interaction in column (7) suggests that it also matters for firms' reactions whether the
net interest payments exceed the 30% EBITDA threshold.
Table 13 in the Appendix serves as a general sensivity analysis of the results presented
in Table 4. In Table 13, the dependent variable is not the debt to assets ratio, but
the net interest payments to assets. This accounts for the firms' possibility to align
themselves with the new interest barrier by lowering their charged internal interest rates
instead of reducing the debt to assets ratio. As can be seen, the conclusions to be drawn
from Table 13 are the same as those from Table 4. Treated firms did not lower their
internal net interest payments after the interest barrier introduction. We rather see a
reduction of external net interest payments. The positive and significant coefficient of
treated ∗ reform for internal debt indicates that treated firms exhibit an increased ratio
compared to non-treated firms. This might be due to the fact that treated firms have a
low profitability and need more debt to survive. See the discussion of Table 8 for details.
In tracing hypotheses H1 to H3, we only made the difference whether a company is
hypothetically treated by the interest barrier or not or if it is treated more severely than
by the old one. We did not distinguish to what degree such a company may be affected. It
is probable that those firms which are denied only a minor amount of interest deductibility,
might not consider changing, i.e. lowering, their leverage. As a robustness check, and in
order to test hypotheses H4 and H5, we run additional regressions. In these regressions, we
focus on highly leveraged companies and on companies with a low profitability. Analytical
reasons for concentrating on these groups have been outlined in Section 3 above.
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Table 7: Regressions comparing highly leveraged companies with other companies
all debt internal debt external debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all companies
dependent ∗
reform
0.0109 0.0147 0.0093
(0.0073) (0.0096) (0.0101)
high lev ∗
reform
-0.0078** 0.0340*** -0.0316*** 0.0183 0.0222*** 0.0280**
(0.0035) (0.0099) (0.0078) (0.0125) (0.0075) (0.0137)
high lev ∗
reform ∗ dep
-0.0393*** -0.0502*** -0.0034
(0.0105) (0.0150) (0.0159)
observations 94320 87519 70339 65097 70339 65097
companies 27910 25466 22617 20614 22617 20614
R2 0.0955 0.0998 0.0193 0.0206 0.0520 0.0539
F1 8.23*** 5.89*** 0.54
F2 7.09*** 8.13*** 6.57***
nationals
dependent ∗
reform
0.0090 0.0133 0.0093
(0.0073) (0.0095) (0.0102)
high lev ∗
reform
-0.0052 0.0337*** -0.0307*** 0.0168 0.0244*** 0.0304**
(0.0036) (0.0100) (0.0082) (0.0126) (0.0079) (0.0142)
high lev ∗
reform ∗ dep
-0.0361*** -0.0480*** -0.0032
(0.0105) (0.0154) (0.0165)
observations 85156 78505 61876 56779 61876 56779
companies 25608 23204 20398 18435 20398 18435
R2 0.1027 0.1083 0.0215 0.0231 0.0545 0.0573
F1 7.10*** 5.09*** 0.52
F2 5.96*** 6.84*** 7.09***
multinationals
high lev ∗
reform
-0.0401*** n.a. -0.0363 n.a. -0.0033 n.a.
(0.0139) n.a. (0.0243) n.a. (0.0233) n.a.
observations 9164 n.a. 8463 n.a. 8463 n.a.
companies 2302 n.a. 2219 n.a. 2219 n.a.
R2 0.1090 n.a. 0.0618 n.a. 0.0893 n.a.
The dependent variable is debt to assets. High lev ∗ reform is an interaction of dummies which equals
1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm is among the 5%
highest leveraged firms defined by the mean of the three years before the reform. Regression 2 compares
the effect for independent and dependent firms. A negative sign of the three-way interaction high lev ∗
reform ∗ dep means that the difference between debt to assets before and after the reform is lower for
highly leveraged companies than for firms with lower debt, especially if they are dependent and therefore
potentially affected by the interest barrier. The list of control variables is the same as in the other tables,
the respective results are not reported. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt
to assets as the dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include
company and industry-year-fixed effects. Observations for German corporations between 2005 and 2010
stem from the DAFNE-database. In the first panel we show results for all firms, in the second and third
panel we distinguish between national and multinational firms. For multinationals, there is no distinction
between independent and dependent firms, as here all multinationals are dependent per definition. F1 is
the test-statistic for a test of joint significance of dependent ∗ reform and high lev ∗ reform ∗ dep, F2 is
the test-statistic for a test of joint significance of high lev ∗ reform and high lev ∗ reform ∗ dep. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. ∗ denotes significance at the
10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
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Table 7 aims at testing hypothesis H4, stating that after the introduction of the new
interest barrier, especially the 5% previously most highly leveraged companies reduced
their debt to assets ratios. The newly introduced variable high lev distinguishes, whether
a firm is among the 5% most highly leveraged firms in terms of the mean debt to assets
ratio in the three years before the reform. The dummy dependent is zero for firms which
are independent, i.e. do not belong to a group and have no shareholder holding at least
25% of the shares. The new interest barrier does not apply to such independent firms.
We suppose that the dependent highly leveraged and therefore concerned firms relatively
reduced their debt to assets ratios compared to the never affected independent firms.
Table 7 is split into three horizontal sections with results for all companies in the first,
national companies in the second and multinationals in the third section. All the control
variables of the previous three tables are included in the regressions, but not reported in
Table 7. They remained qualitatively very similar to the previous estimations in terms
of size, sign and significance. Concentrating on all companies in the upper section of
Table 7, we see that the most highly leveraged firms indeed reduced their overall leverage
after the reform. This can be seen from the significant coefficient high lev ∗ reform in
column (1), amounting to -0.0078 and from the results presented in column (2). The
coefficient of the three-way interaction high lev ∗ reform ∗ dep is negative and highly
significant, indicating that the reaction to the reform differs not only between highly
leveraged companies and firms with a lower debt to assets ratio, but that the difference
between these two groups especially depends on the fact if the company is independent
and therefore potentially affected by the interest barrier or not. Dependent ∗ reform
and high lev ∗ reform ∗ dep are jointly significant, which can be seen from the value
of F1 in Table 7. This means that dependent highly leveraged firms relatively decreased
their debt to assets ratios after the reform compared to highly leveraged but independent
firms. These results confirm hypothesis H4.
The results presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 show that the most highly
leveraged firms indeed reduced their internal debt to assets ratio. Thus, by contrast to
the general result drawn from Tables 4 to 6, the most highly leveraged firms seem to show
the reaction intended by the interest barrier. The reaction can be identified, however, only
for the national firms, as can be seen from the significant coefficients -0.0307 and -0.0480
at the center of Table 7. For multinationals, by contrast, the effect on the internal debt
to assets ratio is insignificant. Only the coefficient dealing with the total debt to assets
ratio is negative and significant. For such multinational companies, there is no distinction
between independent and dependent firms, as here all multinationals are dependent by
definition. With regards to external debt, columns (5) and (6) of Table 7 show only
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positive significant coefficients for the crucial variables. These findings suggest that the
most highly leveraged firms increased their external debt after the reform compared to
companies with lower debt to assets ratios. This result opposes to H3 and H4. Given that
we, however, observe a reduction in internal leverage, the increase of external debt might
in some sense just compensate this development. Testing the same hypotheses based on
the 10% instead of the 5% most highly leveraged firms led to qualitatively very similar
results.
The weak evidence in Table 7 suggests that at least some highly leveraged firms cut
their internal debt to assets ratios, which is in line with the goals of the new interest
barrier. However, these results cannot be identified for multinational firms. Based on our
findings in Tables 4 to 6 we therefore rely on our previous conclusion that the interest
barrier is harmfull especially for firms and kinds of leverage that were not targeted by
this new rule.
In Table 8, we aim at testing hypothesis H5, stating that after the introduction of the
new interest barrier, especially the least profitable companies reduced their debt to assets
ratio. The rationale behind this hypothesis has been outlined in Section 3 and 4. The
overall structure of Table 8 is similar to the previous table. The newly introduced binary
variable low prof equals one if the considered firm is among the group of firms with the
5% lowest profitability in terms of the mean profitability in the three years before the
reform. Column (1) shows the overall effect. The positive and significant coefficients run
in opposition against hypothesis H5. The least profitable firms have increased their debt
to assets ratios. This can be observed both for the national firms and for multinationals.
If the firms were supposed to make their leverage decisions solely based on the interest
barrier, their behavior is counter-intuitive. From a general point of view, however, the
increase in the debt to assets ratio for the least profitable firms is well understandable.
Firms with extremely low profitability seem to have other concerns than their interest
deductibility. They are in need of financing to keep their business running. Due to a lack
of internal funds and a decent attractiveness to equity investors, they necessarily increase
their debt. This result is in line with the negative coefficient of the control variable
profitability, meaning that more profitable companies have lower debt to assets ratios
than low profitable firms.
The results from column (2) of Table 8 reveal an interesting additional aspect. The gen-
eral positive effect of low prof ∗ reform persists, but the three-way interaction low prof
∗ reform ∗ dep shows negative and significant coefficients of -0.1299 and -0.1343 respec-
tively. As it is also jointly significant with dependent ∗ reform, we can conclude that,
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Table 8: Regressions comparing firms with lowest profitability with other companies
all debt internal debt external debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all companies
dependent ∗
reform
0.0126* 0.0192*** 0.0077
(0.0069) (0.0073) (0.0100)
low prof ∗
reform
0.0175*** 0.1487** -0.0061 0.4059*** 0.0229*** -0.0061
(0.0057) (0.0630) (0.0066) (0.0104) (0.0066) (0.0119)
low prof ∗
reform ∗ dep
-0.1299** -0.4134*** 0.0314**
(0.0633) (0.0121) (0.0134)
observations 92938 86247 69481 64306 69481 64306
companies 26880 24521 21962 20010 21962 20010
R2 0.0961 0.1007 0.0183 0.0203 0.0522 0.0542
F1 3.41** 832.72*** 10.03***
F2 7.49*** 767.71*** 6.71***
nationals
dependent ∗
reform
0.0110 0.0179** 0.0079
(0.0069) (0.0073) (0.0101)
low prof ∗
reform
0.0144** 0.1508** -0.0081 0.4047*** 0.0232*** 0.0028
(0.0060) (0.0636) (0.0072) (0.0111) (0.0073) (0.0125)
low prof ∗
reform ∗ dep
-0.1343** -0.4141*** 0.0237*
(0.0638) (0.0130) (0.0142)
observations 83847 77306 61079 56049 61079 56049
companies 24631 22312 19787 17875 19787 17875
R2 0.1033 0.1092 0.0206 0.0229 0.0546 0.0575
F1 3.15** 684.37*** 5.34***
F2 5.97*** 675.58*** 5.77***
multinationals
low prof ∗
reform
0.0322* n.a. 0.0089 n.a. 0.0147 n.a.
(0.0168) n.a. (0.0155) n.a. (0.0166) n.a.
observations 9091 n.a. 8402 n.a. 8402 n.a.
companies 2249 n.a. 2175 n.a. 2175 n.a.
R2 0.1097 n.a. 0.0611 n.a. 0.0899 n.a.
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Low prof ∗ reform is an interaction of dummies which equals
1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm is among the
group of firms with the 5% lowest profitability defined by the mean of the three years before the reform.
Regression 2 compares the effect for independent and dependent firms. A negative sign of the three-way
interaction low prof ∗ reform ∗ dep means that the difference between debt to assets before and after
the reform is lower for companies with the lowest profitability than for firms with a higher profitability,
especially if they are dependent and therefore potentially affected by the interest barrier. The list of
control variables is the same as in the other tables, the respective results are not reported. Regressions 3
and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable, regressions 5 and
6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-fixed effects. Observations
for German corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. In the first panel we
show results for all firms, in the second and third panel we distinguish between national and multinational
firms. For multinationals, there is no distinction between independent and dependent firms, as here all
multinationals are dependent per definition. F1 is the test-statistic for a test of joint significance of
dependent ∗ reform and low prof ∗ reform ∗ dep, F2 is the test-statistic for a test of joint significance
of low prof ∗ reform and low prof ∗ reform ∗ dep. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary
level, are shown in parentheses. ∗ denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the
1%-level.
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among the group of low profitable firms, the dependent firms relatively decreased their
debt to assets ratios compared to the independent firms. Therefore, even though the in-
terest barrier does not play the most important role for the low profitable firms overall, it
still seems to be considered in the way supposed in hypotheses H5. This cannot be shown
for multinational firms, however, because all multinationals are dependent firms. As can
be seen from column (4) of Table 8, the positive general effect and the negative interest
barrier effect prevail when focusing on the internal debt to assets ratio. The results in
columns (5) and (6), indicating an increased external debt to assets ratio for national
firms with the lowest profitability, oppose the general hypothesis H3 for these kinds of
firms. Concerning external debt, hypothesis H5 is not confirmed by low profitability firms
either. Testing hypothesis H5 based on the 10% instead of the 5% least profitable firms
led to qualitatively very similar results.
8 Conclusion
We have analyzed the impact of the new interest barrier on firms' financing structures. We
distinguish between national firms and multinationals and between the effects on internal
debt to assets and external debt to assets. The interest barrier has been introduced as of
2008 with the primary purpose of preventing multinationals from abusive tax avoidance
by means of cross-border internal loans.
In our general regressions, we find that the interest barrier made firms lower their debt
to assets ratios and their net interest payments. Opposing its original intention, it seems
to be, however, the national rather than the multinational firms which adjusted their
capital structure and it is external rather than internal debt which is reduced. Therefore,
at large we conclude that the interest barrier does indeed affect financing decisions, but
predominantly not in the intended way and not of the intended firms.
In a robustness check, we find that highly leveraged firms reduce their internal debt to
assets ratios. This reaction can, however, only be reliably identified for national firms. It
is unclear if, at least, the most likely targeted multinationals were influenced by the new
interest barrier in the way intended.
A further robustness check reveals that, as expected, firms which are likely to be subject
to the interest barrier because they have a very low profitability tackle the threat of non-
deductible interest by relatively reducing their debt to assets ratios. This interest barrier
effect, however, is overcompensated by such firms' basic need for debt financing to keep
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their business running. Therefore, in total, low profitable firms relatively increased their
leverage after the reform.
All in all, our empirical evidence does not give a positive reference to the new inter-
est barrier rule. The legislator might have focused too much on the, albeit, justified
and comprehensible task to counteract excessive and abusive internal lending by a few
multinationals. Based on the evidence found in this study, the end may hardly justify
the means. Significantly influencing i.e. distorting the financing decisions of companies
which were not even aimed at is considerable collateral damage. At the same time, from
an empirical point of view, it remains unclear if the unbeloved multinational financing
structures could be prevented effectively.
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9 Appendix
Table 9: Baseline Regressions, all firms, at least once treated
all debt internal debt external debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
oncetreated ∗
reform
-0.0074* 0.0008 -0.0111**
(0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0051)
once stricter ∗
reform
-0.0077 0.0100 -0.0195***
(0.0058) (0.0064) (0.0065)
tangibility 0.0323* 0.0370 -0.0185 0.0190 0.0378 0.0086
(0.0189) (0.0350) (0.0228) (0.0409) (0.0243) (0.0392)
profitability -0.1873*** -0.1848*** -0.0748*** -0.1091*** -0.1099*** -0.0799***
(0.0069) (0.0116) (0.0085) (0.0134) (0.0081) (0.0119)
loss carryforward 0.1595*** 0.1238*** 0.0281** 0.0558*** 0.1077*** 0.0623***
(0.0090) (0.0150) (0.0112) (0.0177) (0.0111) (0.0162)
str ∗ loss carryfwd -0.3836*** -0.2859*** -0.0546* -0.1284** -0.2628*** -0.1409***
(0.0261) (0.0434) (0.0322) (0.0510) (0.0322) (0.0467)
str ∗ tangibility -0.1471*** -0.1061 -0.1107** -0.1691* -0.0564 0.0688
(0.0430) (0.0825) (0.0559) (0.0992) (0.0567) (0.0921)
ln employees 0.0192*** 0.0211*** -0.0085*** -0.0081* 0.0274*** 0.0285***
(0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0037)
observations 95211 29649 70987 27665 70987 27665
companies 28213 7878 22897 7661 22897 7661
R2 0.0969 0.0969 0.0184 0.0348 0.0517 0.0533
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Once treated ∗ reform is an interaction of dummies which
equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm would
have been treated by the new rule at least in one year before the introduction. A negative sign of
the coefficient means that the difference between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for
treated firms compared to companies not treated by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we use
the interaction once stricter ∗ reform to analyze if firms, for which the new interest barrier would have
been stricter than the old rule at least in one year before the reform, reduced their debt to assets ratios
more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other firms. Other variables are described in Table
1. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable,
regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-fixed
effects. Observations of German corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. ∗ denotes significance
at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
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Table 10: Baseline Regressions, nationals, at least once treated
all debt internal debt external debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
once treated ∗
reform
-0.0071 -0.0021 -0.0079
(0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0062)
once stricter ∗
reform
-0.0140** 0.0029 -0.0184**
(0.0070) (0.0079) (0.0078)
tangibility 0.0330* 0.0475 -0.0111 0.0379 0.0299 -0.0032
(0.0193) (0.0367) (0.0235) (0.0443) (0.0254) (0.0427)
profitability -0.1877*** -0.1755*** -0.0708*** -0.1055*** -0.1120*** -0.0737***
(0.0072) (0.0123) (0.0091) (0.0147) (0.0087) (0.0131)
loss carryforward 0.1534*** 0.1272*** 0.0246** 0.0599*** 0.1048*** 0.0607***
(0.0094) (0.0164) (0.0121) (0.0204) (0.0121) (0.0183)
str ∗ loss carryfwd -0.3659*** -0.2932*** -0.0512 -0.1498** -0.2477*** -0.1244**
(0.0271) (0.0476) (0.0348) (0.0588) (0.0348) (0.0527)
str ∗ tangibility -0.1763*** -0.1711** -0.1351** -0.2246** -0.0647 0.0657
(0.0437) (0.0866) (0.0578) (0.1077) (0.0586) (0.0994)
ln employees 0.0167*** 0.0167*** -0.0098*** -0.0102** 0.0254*** 0.0266***
(0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0030) (0.0047) (0.0030) (0.0041)
observations 85889 23905 62381 22098 62381 22098
companies 25851 6483 20622 6276 20622 6276
R2 0.1042 0.1089 0.0206 0.0427 0.0540 0.0575
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Once treated ∗ reform is an interaction of dummies which
equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm would
have been treated by the new rule at least in one year before the introduction. A negative sign of
the coefficient means that the difference between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for
treated firms compared to companies not affected by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we use
the interaction once stricter ∗ reform to analyze if firms, for which the new interest barrier would have
been stricter than the old rule at least in one year before the reform, reduced their debt to assets ratios
more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other firms. Other variables are described in Table
1. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable,
regressions 5 an 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-fixed
effects. Observations of German corporations not being a member of a multinational group between 2005
and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are
shown in parentheses. ∗ denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
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Table 11: Baseline Regressions, multinationals, at least once treated
all debt internal debt external debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
once treated ∗
reform
-0.0213** 0.0027 -0.0249***
(0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0093)
once stricter ∗
reform
-0.0062 0.0161 -0.0242**
(0.0102) (0.0107) (0.0113)
tangibility 0.1182 0.0251 -0.0199 -0.0757 0.1022 0.0982
(0.0852) (0.1169) (0.0945) (0.1219) (0.0846) (0.1079)
profitability -0.1799*** -0.2210*** -0.0965*** -0.1236*** -0.0966*** -0.1033***
(0.0229) (0.0311) (0.0230) (0.0313) (0.0213) (0.0275)
loss carryforward 0.1789*** 0.1016*** 0.0362 0.0220 0.1174*** 0.0775**
(0.0310) (0.0363) (0.0294) (0.0347) (0.0293) (0.0355)
str ∗ loss carryfwd -0.4443*** -0.2366** -0.0407 -0.0015 -0.3312*** -0.2266**
(0.0901) (0.1048) (0.0853) (0.1006) (0.0857) (0.1035)
str ∗ tangibility -0.0608 0.1422 -0.1221 0.0160 0.0791 0.1029
(0.2173) (0.2853) (0.2387) (0.3024) (0.2170) (0.2659)
ln employees 0.0324*** 0.0356*** -0.0045 -0.0018 0.0368*** 0.0346***
(0.0062) (0.0067) (0.0075) (0.0086) (0.0072) (0.0083)
observations 9322 5744 8606 5567 8606 5567
companies 2362 1395 2275 1385 2275 1385
R2 0.1110 0.1382 0.0597 0.0800 0.0901 0.1035
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Once treated ∗ reform is an interaction of dummies which
equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm would
have been treated by the new rule at least in one year before the introduction. A negative sign of
the coefficient means that the difference between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for
treated firms compared to companies not affected by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we use
the interaction once stricter ∗ reform to analyze if firms, for which the new interest barrier would have
been stricter than the old rule at least in one year before the reform, reduced their debt to assets ratios
more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other firms. Other variables are described in Table
1. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the debendent variable,
regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-fixed
effects. Observations for German corporations being a member of a multinational group between 2005
and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are
shown in parentheses. ∗ denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
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Table 13: Baseline Regressions using net interest payments per assets as dependent vari-
able, all firms
all net interest payments internal net int. pay. external net int. pay.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated ∗ reform -0.0068*** 0.0014** -0.0084***
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0016)
stricter ∗ reform -0.0049*** 0.0012 -0.0072***
(0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0017)
tangibility 0.0148*** 0.0150*** 0.0062 0.0103 0.0069 0.0037
(0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0059) (0.0085) (0.0077) (0.0101)
profitability -0.0007 -0.0045*** -0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0003 -0.0004
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0035)
loss carryforward 0.0031** 0.0004 0.0019 0.0012 -0.0026 -0.0014
(0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0037)
str ∗ loss carryfwd -0.0026 0.0060 -0.0042 -0.0027 0.0117 0.0098
(0.0037) (0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0063) (0.0083) (0.0103)
str ∗ tangibility 0.0148*** 0.0102 -0.0275* -0.0316 0.0526*** 0.0534**
(0.0051) (0.0079) (0.0141) (0.0199) (0.0181) (0.0240)
ln employees 0.0006** 0.0003 -0.0007** -0.0008* 0.0009* 0.0009
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006)
observations 88333 29631 29225 17829 29225 17829
companies 25746 7877 10077 5653 10077 5653
R2 0.0594 0.0497 0.0385 0.0315 0.0777 0.0525
The dependent variable is net interest payments to assets. Treated ∗ reform is an interaction of dum-
mies which equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm
would have been treated by the new rule in all three years before the introduction. A negative sign of
the coefficient means that the difference between the net interest payments before and after the reform is
lower for treated firms compared to companies not affected by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we
use the interaction stricter ∗ reform to analyze if firms, for which the new interest barrier would have
been stricter than the old rule in all three years before the reform, reduced their net interest payments
to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extend than other firms. Other variables are
described in Table 1. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the
dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and
industry-year-fixed effects. Observations for German corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the
DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. ∗
denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
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